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FUNDING OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION PLANS:
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR?
ISRAEL GOLDOWITZ1
***
Public pensions can be poorly funded, and, if recent events are any
guide, benefit promises may be impaired in municipal bankruptcies.
Experience with private-sector pension plans suggests that responsible
funding is the best protection against default risk.
Studebaker’s default on promised pensions inspired the 1974 federal
pension reform act, ERISA. The company’s pension plan was substantially
underfunded when the company failed, despite periodic contributions under
pre-ERISA standards. The plan’s assets first paid retirees’ benefits, leaving
7,000 younger workers with little to nothing in retirement. ERISA addressed
this default risk through funding rules and PBGC insurance.
ERISA’s minimum funding rules have not prevented pension plan
failure. To the contrary, the PBGC and plan participants have absorbed
some large losses. However, the funding rules remain the primary
protection against default risk.

Chief Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (“PBGC”), Adjunct Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center (“GULC”). Views expressed do not reflect the
views of PBGC, GULC, or any other organization.
I thank Amy Monahan, Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School,
for the opportunity to present this concept at the American Law Institute’s 2015
conference, The Law and Public Pensions, and Brendan Maher, Professor at the
University of Connecticut Law School, for the opportunity to present at the Fifth
Annual National Benefits & Social Insurance Conference in 2016. Professor
Monahan’s work is an important starting point for anyone who wants to understand
the issues that affect public pensions. E.g., Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal
Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.,
117 (2015); Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy B. Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good
Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance
to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1317 (2014). Natalya Shnitser, Assistant
Professor at Boston College Law School, has done important empirical work in this
area. Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An
Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663 (2015).
I thank Sam Alberts, James Armbruster, Christopher Bone, Julie Cameron,
Charles Finke, Amy Monahan, Kathryn Moore, James O’Neill, Bruce Perlin,
Lawrence Rausch, Sanford Rich, Natalya Shnitser, John Turner, and Andrea Wong
for their critical reading and helpful comments, and Michelle Li for her assistance
with citations. Any errors are mine.
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Among the strengths of ERISA’s funding rules are mandatory
amortization of unfunded liabilities, constraints on actuarial methods and
assumptions, a variety of enforcement tools, and payment restrictions for
poorly funded plans. ERISA also has robust reporting and disclosure
requirements, which can help promote funding discipline.
Congress has amended ERISA’s funding rules many times since
1974, as it addresses competing social and federal revenue-raising goals.
Though generally sound, some changes have been ill-timed or made for the
wrong reasons.
This article’s thesis is that the experience under ERISA, both
positive and negative, has important lessons for public plans. The article
first provides a brief history of legal developments up to ERISA’s enactment.
It then describes ERISA’s minimum standards, which include vesting and
benefit accrual rules, funding standards, fiduciary standards, reporting and
disclosure, and benefit insurance, but which generally do not apply to public
plans. It then surveys ERISA’s funding rules for both single-employer and
multiemployer plans, and provides a history of those rules, showing how
Congress has generally tightened the rules, though it has sometimes relaxed
them. Next, it surveys other controls on funding, such as reporting and
disclosure, accounting rules, and actuarial standards. Finally, it sets forth
conclusions that may be of use to law reformers, among them the need for
funding rules, conservative actuarial assumptions, actuarial independence,
enforcement tools, transparency, and a balance between funding and benefit
promises.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In my tenure with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(“PBGC”), I have often seen pension plans fail that might have survived if
funding rules had been stronger. Among them are plans in the steel and
airline industries that were underfunded by billions of dollars.2

PBGC is the federal agency charged with insuring private-sector defined
benefit pension plans. 29 U.S.C. §1302 (2012). PBGC was established by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §1001-1461. In
carrying out its statutory mission, PBGC devotes much of its day-to-day attention to
financially troubled sponsors of underfunded plans. For an overview, see Israel
Goldowitz, Garth Wilson, Erin Kim, & Kirsten Bender, The PBGC Wins a Case
Whenever the Debtor Keeps Its Pension Plan, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE
2
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Corporate sponsors of PBGC-insured defined benefit plans have
struggled with a number of adverse trends. Among them globalization of
manufacturing and trade, industry obsolescence, and volatility in financial
markets, and pension cost increases due to improvements in life expectancy.
The decline in private sector unionization and the growth in defined
contribution plans have also contributed to the steady decline in private
defined benefit plans. As a result, fewer workers in the defined benefit
system are supporting more retirees for longer periods. That puts an
increasing burden on labor costs and, in turn, the cost of goods and services.
The same pay package supports retiree healthcare in many cases.3
Some of these trends affect defined benefit pension plans for state
and local employees. So the private-sector experience may be useful to those
considering funding rules for public plans.
Public plans cover about 15 million employees and 10 million
retirees and surviving dependents. Based on reported data and plan-specific
actuarial assumptions, public plans are underfunded by more than $1 trillion.
They are 73% funded on average, and plans in Illinois, Connecticut and
Kentucky less than 50% funded. The unfunded liabilities represent an
average taxpayer burden of about $3,000 per capita, with Illinois,
Connecticut, and Ohio at about $7,000.4
L. REV. 257 (2015), http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1005&context=benefits.
3
For another synthesis, see Ilana Boivie, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., Who Killed
the Private Sector DB Plan? (March 2011), http://www.nirsonline.org/
storage/nirs/documents/Who%20Killed%20DBs%20final_who_killed_the_private_sector_db_plan.pdf.
4
Alaska leads the nation at $11,000 per capita and Puerto Rico is close behind
at $10,000. Keith Brainard & Alex Brown, NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE RET. ADMIN.,
Public Fund Survey (“NASRA Survey”) and id., APPENDIX B (Mar. 2016),
http://www.nasra.org/publicfundsurvey; Standard and Poor, Ratings Direct, U.S.
State Pension Funding: Strong Investment Returns Could Life Funded Rations, But
Longer-Term
Challenges
Remain
(Jun.
24,
2014),
http://www.nasra.org/Files/Topical%20Reports/Credit%20Effects/sandpstate1406.
pdf. Data are as of 2014. For accounting and funding purposes, future benefits are
discounted to present value. The higher the assumed interest rate, the lower the
present value. Dan M. McGill, Kyle N. Brown, John J. Haley, Sylvester J. Schieber
& Mark J. Warshawsky, Fundamentals of Private Pensions 207-09 (9th ed. 2010).
The NASRA Survey notes: “Even a small change in a plan’s investment return
assumption can impose a disproportionate impact on a plan’s funding level and cost.
For most of the Public Fund Survey’s measurement period, the median investment
return assumption used by public pension plans was 8.0 percent. Since 2009, a
majority of plans have reduced their assumed investment return, resulting in a
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In the past decade, pension obligations have been a factor in several
municipal bankruptcies. Central Falls, Rhode Island, for example,
negotiated a benefit reduction that in some cases exceeded 40%.5 Detroit
negotiated a 4.5% benefit reduction, along with other benefit concessions, to
resolve litigation with bondholders and present a viable plan of adjustment
of its debts.6 Like many jurisdictions, Detroit had used aggressive interest
rate assumptions to value benefit liabilities, masking the problem. Detroit
had also depleted plan assets by paying a “13th check” during flush times and
overstating the earnings transferred to commonly managed annuity
accounts. 7 Stockton, California, sought to withdraw from the California
Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”), but eventually decided
against it.8
reduction to the median return assumption to 7.75 percent.” Id., Figure N. “Asset
smoothing,” i.e., averaging of returns, can also have a significant effect. See Mary
Williams Walsh & Michael Cooper, New York Gets Sobering Look at Its Pensions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
20,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/
20/nyregion/20pension.html.
5
Mary Williams Walsh, Cuts for the Already Retired, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/pension-deal-in-rhode-islandcould-set-a-trend.html. W. Zachary Malinowski, Chafee Signs Law Giving Retired
Central Falls Police, Firefighters Pension Supplement, PROVIDENCE J. (Aug, 27,
2014),
http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20140827/News/308279896
(noting that the state later enacted legislation to restore up to 75% of the original
amounts).
6
Susan Tompor, Detroit Retirees to See Pension Cuts Starting Monday,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/money/personalfinance/susan-tompor/2015/02/27/detroit-orr-pension-checks-cuts/24144513.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Internal Revenue Manual, § 7.11.6.6.11 (Sept. 18,
2015), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-011-006.html (noting in the private
sector, if a plan “is amended on a regular basis to provide for thirteenth checks…,
the series of amendments may give rise to an expectation of such payments and be
subject to protection as an accrued benefit…”).
7
NATHAN BOMEY, DETROIT RESURRECTED: TO BANKRUPTCY AND BACK 5257, 157-61 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2016).
8
Marc Lifsher and Melody Peterson, Judge Approves Stockton Bankruptcy
Plan; Worker Pensions Safe, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-stockton-pension-court-ruling-cuts-20141029-story.html; In re City
of Stockton, California, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (city authorized to
reject its contract with CalPERS and to avoid a statutory “termination lien” for
pension underfunding under the Bankruptcy Code, which preempts contrary state
law); Id. (noting CalPERS is apparently an “agent” rather than “cost-sharing
multiple-employer plan,” with common administration of separate plans for
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Outside bankruptcy, courts are generally more protective of public
employees’ pension benefits. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court
recently held that Chicago cannot reduce cost-of-living adjustments despite
requiring increased contributions and providing administrative and judicial
remedies, thereby putting pensions on a sounder financial footing for a
greater “net benefit.” “[M]embers of the Funds already have a legally
enforceable right to receive the benefits they have been promised” under the
State Constitution, the Court held. “By offering a purported ‘offsetting
benefit’ of actuarially sound funding and solvency in the Funds, the
legislation merely offers participants in those funds what is already
guaranteed to them—payment of the pension benefits in place when they
joined the fund.”9
Pension funding issues, of course, exist in a larger context of budget
politics.10 To avoid statutory borrowing limits, Detroit set up remote entities
to finance pension debt, collateralized the debt with casino tax revenues, and
tacked on default insurance and interest-rate swaps. 11 The Chicago “net
benefit” proposal was designed to avoid a property tax increase. 12 New
Jersey’s governor declined to follow a law that required inclusion of an
participating employers rather than a single risk pool); see Shnitser, supra note 1, at
688-89.
9
Jones v. Mun. Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 50 N.E.3d
596, 607 (Ill. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).
10
See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, Full Report (2012),
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org. For an influential report focused on public
pensions, see Donald J. Boyd & Pieter J. Kiernan, Strengthening the Security of
Public Sector Defined Benefit Plans, THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T
(St. U. of N.Y. ed., 2014), http://www.rockinst.org/ pdf/government_finance/201401-Blinken_Report_One.pdf.
11
The arrangement was undone in a bankruptcy settlement. Bomey, supra note
7, at 23-30, 92-112.
12
Monica Davey and Mary Williams Walsh, Pensions and Politics Fuel Crisis
in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/05/26/us/politics/illinois-pension-crisis.html. Chicago continues to struggle,
with a new valuation more than doubling the shortfall of its Municipal Employees’
Annuity and Benefit Fund, Elizabeth Campbell, Chicago’s Pension-Fund Woes Just
Became
$11.5
Billion
Bigger,
BLOOMBERG
(May
19,
2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-19/chicago-s-pension-fundtroubles-just-became-11-5-billion-bigger, and the legislature overriding a veto of a
funding relief bill for the uniformed services plan. Elizabeth Campbell, Illinois
Lawmakers Override Veto of Chicago Pension Break, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-30/illinois-senate-moves-tooverride-veto-of-chicago-pension-break.
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actuarially determined “minimum required contribution” as a line item in
annual appropriation acts and conferred a contract right on plan members to
that contribution. The State Supreme Court agreed—“The Debt Limitation
Clause of the State Constitution interdicts the creation . . . of a legally binding
enforceable contract compelling multi-year financial payments in the sizable
amounts” at issue.13
Cities have sold or pledged assets to fund pension costs. Detroit’s
“grand bargain” included a purchase of the Detroit Institute of Art’s
collection by national and local charitable foundations.14 Chicago and other
cities have pledged future parking meter revenues. 15 And Scranton,
Pennsylvania, recently monetized its sewer system in part to pay down its
pension shortfall.16
Pensions, in short, represent a major challenge for state and
municipal finance.17 The concern extends to U.S. territories. In June 2016,
Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
13
Burgos v. State of New Jersey, 118 A.3d 270, 274-75 (N.J. 2015). Later,
condemning “accounting gimmickry,” the governor vetoed a bill calling for
quarterly and supplemental pension contributions. Christopher Baxter, Christie
Vetoes Quarterly N.J. Pension Payments Bill, $300M 'Pre-payment', NJ.COM (Aug.
10, 2015), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/08/christie_vetoes_quartely_
nj_pension_payments_bill.html.
14
Jordan Weissman, Detroit Exits Bankruptcy, Thanks to Its Art Museum,
SLATE (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/11/07/
detroit_exits_bankruptcy_city_s_pensions_saved_in_part_thanks_to_detroit.html.
Some doubt that this could be a template for other cities. Michael J. Bologna, Would
Detroit’s ‘Grand Bargain’ Work in Chicago?, BLOOMBERGBNA (May 6, 2016),
http://www.bna.com/detroits-grand-bargain-n57982070754/. The bargain was
upheld under the doctrine of equitable mootness—which prevents appellate courts
from “unscrambling complex bankruptcy reorganizations.” Ochadleus v City of
Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792 (6 th Cir, 2016) (citations omitted).
15
Donald Cohen, Cities Need to Weigh Costs of Private Partnerships, N.Y.
TIMES, (Jul. 23, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/cities-need-toweigh-costs-of-private-partnerships/.
16
Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Sewer Sale Could Save Scranton Pensions,
SCRANTON TIMES-TRIB. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/sewersale-could-save-scranton-pensions-1.1981682.
17
See generally, James E. Spiotto, How Municipalities in Financial Distress
Should Deal with Unfunded Pension Obligations and Appropriate Funding of
Essential Services, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 515 (2014); Alicia H. Munnell & JeanPierre Aubry, Will Pensions and OPEBs Break State and Local Budgets?, CTR. FOR
RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (Oct. 2016), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/slp_51-1.pdf.
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Stability Act (“PROMESA”), establishing an Oversight Board to restructure
the island’s $72 billion in debt and balance its budget. PROMESA requires
an actuarial study of territorial pensions, but not a compromise of pensions
as part of a restructuring plan.18 Even the pension plan for Marianas Island
employees briefly found shelter in bankruptcy until the case was dismissed
on jurisdictional grounds.19
To be sure, many public plans are reasonably well funded, at least
under stated assumptions.20 In some cases, they survived a larger financial
crisis. In 1976, New York State imposed a Financial Control Board with a
majority of members appointed by the Governor as a condition of rescuing
New York City’s finances.21 The Board remains in place and retains certain
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, S. 2328,
114th Cong. § 211 (2016) (noting PROMESA authorizes the Oversight Board to
conduct an actuarial analysis of any underfunded territorial pension plan to aid “in
evaluating the fiscal and economic impact of the pension cash flows… [such an
analysis would include] (1) an actuarial study of the pension liabilities and funding
strategy that includes a forward looking projection of payments of at least 30 years
of benefit payments and funding strategy to cover such payments; (2) sources of
funding to cover such payments; (3) a review of the existing benefits and their
sustainability; and (4) a review of the system’s legal structure and operational
arrangements, and any other studies of the pension system the Oversight Board shall
deem necessary.”) Peter Roff, A Bad Bailout for Puerto Rico, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.
(May
26,
2016),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2016-05-26/house-bill-promesa-that-grants-bailout-to-puerto-rico-rips-offbondholders (“Puerto Rico's general obligation bonds . . . would [] take a back seat
to Puerto Rico's almost totally underfunded $46 billion public pension system”).
Puerto Rico’s pension system is described in Nick Brown, Puerto Rico’s Other
Crisis: Impoverished Pensions, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/usa-puertorico-pensions. A recent audit indicates that
Puerto Rico’s Employees’ Retirement System, with a reported $30 billion in
liabilities, will run out of money within a year. Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Pension
Risks Insolvency Next Year, Audit Says, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 3, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-02/puerto-rico-pension-planrisks-insolvency-next-year-audit-says.
19
Caitlin Kenney, Judge Says Pension Fund Can't Seek Bankruptcy Protection,
NPR (Jun. 5, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/06/05/154302347/
judge-says-pension-fund-cant-seek-bankruptcy-protection.
20
Brainard & Brown, supra note 4.
21
CONG. BUDGET OFF., The Causes of New York City’s Fiscal Crisis 1975, 90
POL. SCI. Q. 659 (Winter 1975-76); Roger Dunstan, CAL. RES. BUREAU, CAL. STATE
LIBR.,
Overview
of
New
York
City’s
Fiscal
Crisis
(1995),
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/95/notes/v3n1.pdf. As part of the compromise, the
City teachers’ pension fund bought bonds of the Municipal Assistance Corporation,
18
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oversight duties. 22 New York City’s pensions have respectable funding
ratios, though hardly strong ones. 23 As part of the federal rescue of the
District of Columbia’ finances in 1997, Congress had the federal government
takeover $4.8 billion in unfunded pension liability for DC police,
firefighters, teachers, and judges; froze the plans; adopted an amortization
schedule; and authorized replacement plans. The new plans were required
to be funded under standards borrowed from ERISA as then in effect. These
plans have strong funding ratios.24
II.

OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PENSION LAW

ERISA governs private-sector employee benefit plans. 25 ERISA
sets minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit accrual, funding,
fiduciary conduct, and reporting and disclosure. ERISA also established
PBGC to insure benefits under failed defined benefit plans.26

which was formed to provide the City with emergency financing. Eric Jaffe,
CITYLAB, The Time the Teachers' Union Saved New York from Bankruptcy (July 24,
2013), http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/07/time-teachers-union-save-new-yorkcity-bankruptcy/6306.
22
STATE OF N.Y., FIN. CONTROL BD., MISSION STATEMENT,
http://www.fcb.state.ny.us (“During sunset, the Control Board must review the fouryear financial plan at least quarterly, and must notify the City if a plan or
modification to the financial plan does not conform to the Act's standards. In
addition, the Control Board must make a determination annually whether a new
control period . . . should be declared”).
23
New York City’s two largest pension plans have funding ratios of 58% and
70%. The statewide plans have ratios greater than 90 percent. NASRA, PUBLIC
FUND SURVEY, APPENDIX B, supra note 4. The State’s budget process can obscure
the facts, however, and pension funding is no exception. RICHARD RAVITCH, SO
MUCH TO DO: A FULL LIFE OF BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND CONFRONTING FISCAL
CRISES 215-16 (2014) (contribution of promissory notes under the guise of “pension
smoothing”).
24
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§11001-11087, 111 Stat.
251, 715-31 (1997). See EDWIN C. HUSTEAD, PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 354362 (Olivia S. Mitchell and Edwin C. Hustead, eds. 2001). Those plans now have
89-percent and 107-percent funding ratios. NASRA, supra note 4.
25
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453 (2014). ERISA exempts governmental plans. 26
U.S.C. § 414(d) (2015); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(1) (2002), 1321(b)(2) (2008).
26
29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1453. A defined benefit plan is one that promises a benefit
based on a formula, typically a percentage of final pay times years of service. 29
USC § 1002(35) (2008). Because the benefit is due regardless of the plan’s funding
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The House Ways and Means Committee, one of the committees of
jurisdiction, saw responsible funding as the main protection for vested
benefits under such plans— “Without adequate funding, a promise of a
pension may be illusory and empty.” Moreover, “[t]o create a plan
termination insurance program without appropriate funding standards would
permit those who present the greatest risk in terms of exposure to benefit at
the expense of employers who have developed conscientious funding
programs.”27
A.

HISTORY OF PENSION REGULATION

Pensions were originally a workforce management tool.28 A trained
workforce is a valuable asset. But pay increases as worker’s advance, and
workers wear out as they age, especially in industrial jobs. So at some point,
it makes sense to replace older workers. By giving older workers an
incentive to retire and new hires an incentive to stay, pensions help to
manage turnover.
The first pensions were for the military. Private pensions were first
introduced by steel companies, railroads, and public utilities in the late 19th
Century. Pensions for federal civilian employees and state and local
employees are mainly a 20th Century development.29
State courts initially saw pensions as gratuities, and unenforceable.30
A few courts saw a pension promise as an offer of a unilateral contract—
promise for performance—to a class of persons. For example, if an employer
promises anyone who works 20 years and reaches age 65 a pension of onestatus, investment risk is on the employer. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1999).
27
H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 at 7, 14 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4645, 4652.
28
LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION
AND WELFARE BENEFITS 7 (3d ed. 2012) (citing MERTON C. BERNSTEIN, THE
FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 10 (1964)).
29
ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG, & JACK W. WILSON, PENSION RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (U. Penn.
Press ed. 2003), http://www.pensionresearchcouncil.org/publications/pdf/0-81223714-5-1.pdf; JEFFREY LEWIS, MYRON D. RUMELT, & IVELISSE BERIO LEBEAU,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 1-1 (3d ed. 2012); David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA
Preemption
of
State Law:
A
Study
of
Effective
Federalism,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 438 (1987).
30
E.g., McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898),
aff’d per curiam, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901), cited in Gregory, supra note 29.
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third of her final pay for life, any member of the class who meets these
conditions would have a contractual right to a pension.31
A worker rights theory mainly emerged in other forums. For
example, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) developed a theory of vesting
in plan assets when a plan terminates (or when a major downsizing can be
considered a termination for affected employees).32 The IRS administers the
rules that allow pension plans to be tax-qualified. Employer contributions to
a qualified plan are tax deductible, the plan’s earnings are not taxed, and
employees are taxed only on their distributions. 33 No employer wants its
plan to be disqualified, given the substantial tax benefits at stake.
The Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (“LMRA”), altered the
balance of power between management and labor, and included pension
provisions. Some unions had negotiated pension and health benefit plans
funded by employers. Congress required that the money be held in trust, that
contributions be governed by a written agreement, and that the trust be
administered by equal numbers of employer and union appointees.34 In light
of these requirements, some courts held that if the trustees changed the
eligibility rules and did so arbitrarily, they could be compelled to honor the
prior rules.35

See Wickstrom v. Vern E. Alden Co., 240 N.E. 2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)
(early retirement offer), cited in 1-3 Corbin on Contracts § 3.16 (2006). An example
well-known to lawyers is Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 1 QB 256 (1893).
A vendor put an ad in a newspaper saying that anyone who bought this contraption
and inhaled its vapors and still contracted the flu would be paid 100 pounds. The
court held that this was an offer to a class and that any member of the class who met
the conditions had accepted the offer and held an enforceable right to payment.
32
Isidore Goodman, Developing Pension and Profit-Sharing Requisites, 13
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1972). See In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp.
1149 (S.D. Tex. 1991). See also Lewis, supra note 29, at 1-5 (Tax Code’s “exclusive
benefit” rule was designed to curb deductions for amounts subject to recapture by
revocation of pension trust, but also to encourage formation of trusts on which
employees can rely for retirement income); 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(3) (2014).
33
29 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a), 501(a).
34
As trustees, those appointees serve as fiduciaries, not collective bargaining
representatives. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
35
See Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“[the] authorities
are divided as to whether an applicant for a pension has a contractual interest in the
Fund as a third party beneficiary to the Wage Agreement, or whether his interest is
merely equitable and conditioned on meeting the eligibility requirements reasonably
established by the Trustees. Since our view of the present case does not require a
determination of this controversy, we express no opinion on it.”).
31
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In 1948, the National Labor Relations Board held that pensions are
among the terms and conditions of employment, and, as such, a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining.36 In 1958, Congress enacted the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 37 which required all employee benefit
plans to file an annual report with the Department of Labor. But there was
no comprehensive federal law until ERISA.
B.

ERISA’S MINIMUM STANDARDS

ERISA’s minimum standards codify an understanding that pensions
are deferred compensation for services rendered.38 Among its key features,
ERISA:










requires that employees be allowed to participate in a plan after
a minimal length of service;
requires that benefits vest within a reasonable period, so
employees do not forfeit their rights if they go to work
elsewhere, become disabled, or retire early;
requires that a surviving spouse receive a benefit, to protect nonworking spouses;
provides that accrued benefits generally cannot be reduced;
requires that defined benefit plans be advance funded;
imposes minimum standards of prudence and loyalty on plan
fiduciaries, and prohibits self-dealing;
requires annual financial reporting, and plain-English disclosure
of plan terms;
provides for federal insurance of defined benefit pension plans
if they terminate (single-employer plans) or become insolvent
(multiemployer plans);
authorizes the Labor Department and plan participants to
enforce the minimum standards;

Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) (noting that a failure
to bargain in good faith on the terms and condition of employment is an unfair labor
practice). 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(5); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
37
Welfare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997
(1958).
38
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), 1001(b) (“…the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee
benefit] plans… [ERISA’s declared policy is to] protect interstate commerce and the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . .”).
36
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broadly preempts State law as it relates to employee benefit
plans; and
opens the federal courts to benefit claims.39

Like all legislation, however, ERISA represents a compromise. In
the first place, ERISA does not require an employer to have a plan. Nor did
Congress want to deter employers from establishing or continuing plans by
making them too expensive.40 Thus, for instance, ERISA does not require
immediate vesting. 41 Most important for our purpose, ERISA does not
require that benefits be fully funded. Rather, it allows a funding shortfall to
be amortized over a period of years.42
ERISA’s minimum standards are found in the Labor title of the U.S.
Code (Title 29) as positive law. Thus, for example, the vesting and anticutback rules are enforceable in court.43 The minimum standards are also
found in the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26), mainly as conditions of tax
qualification. To enjoy favorable tax treatment, an employer must (for
example) ensure that its plan meets the vesting and anti-cutback

39

1453.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25, 1052-55, 1082-85(a), 1102-11, 1114(a), 1132, 1301-

See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 supra note 27, at 9 (“The Committee believes that
the legislative approach of establishing minimum standards and safeguards for
private pensions is not only consistent with retention of the freedom of decisionmaking vital to pension plans, but in furtherance of the growth and development of
the private pension system.”).
41
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976) (permitting employers to use ten-year
“cliff” vesting under defined benefit plans; an employee was not vested at all until
after ten years of participation, and then became 100% vested) with 29 U.S.C. §
1053(a) (2000) (mandating five-year cliff vesting).
42
See infra p.16 (noting ERISA initially provided for a series of charges and
credits to a “funding standard account,” each to be amortized over a period that in
some cases was as long as 30 years. Under current law, there is a single “shortfall,”
generally amortized over seven years.) See James Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story
of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins
of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 700-01 (2001) (noting Pension plans generally
begin life with a significant unfunded past service liability, as they usually grant
credit for service with the employer before it established the plan. Otherwise, at
least in a unionized workplace, senior employees might prefer to forgo pensions in
favor of larger paychecks.); Malcolm Gladwell, The Risk Pool, THE NEW YORKER
(Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/08/28/the-risk-pool.
43
E.g., Cent. Laborers Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004).
40
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requirements. 44 By Executive Order, President Carter allocated primary
authority between the Department of Labor and the Department of
Treasury/Internal Revenue Service. Treasury/IRS has primary authority
over the funding rules.45
Because qualified plans are tax advantaged, Congress has
historically used the qualification rules to promote broader pension coverage
and other pension policy goals.
For example, the Tax Codeo
nondiscrimination rules, introduced by the Revenue Act of 1942, are
designed to ensure that rank-and-file workers get some of the benefits that
top management does.46 But fiscal concerns have also led Congress to adjust
the funding rules to reduce deductible contributions, so as to raise revenue
or permit a spending bill to “erore” well.47
C.

PENSION INSURANCE UNDER ERISA

The rallying cry for pension reform was the failure of the Studebaker
Company. The automaker was unable to compete with GM, Ford and
Chrysler, and it was forced to liquidate in 1963. Studebaker had a defined
benefit plan with a formula similar to the ones at the Big Three. As was
26 U.S.C. § 4971 (2014) (noting the funding rules, however, are not
conditions of tax qualification. The IRS enforces funding by assessing excise taxes,
10% of the annual shortfall, and 100% if the shortfall is not made up.); 26 U.S.C. §
430(k) (2015) (noting PBGC also enforces the funding rules by perfecting and
enforcing liens when contributions of more than $1 million are delinquent).
45
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, reprinted in 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct.
17, 1978); See Panel 3: Negotiating the Agency Peace Treaty: Reorganization Plan
No. 4, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 319-39 (Spring 2014). (For a discussion of the
administration of ERISA in its infancy).
46
Another purpose of the nondiscrimination rules, though, was to prevent tax
evasion by firms seeking to shelter executives’ compensation. The 1942
nondiscrimination provision was “particularly anemic.” Not surprisingly, the main
purpose of the bill was to “extract the maximum contribution from taxpayers . . .
during the austere and expensive years of the Second World War.” See Madeline
Sexton Lewis, The Legislative History of the Nondiscrimination Provision of
Qualified Retirement Plans, 2014-7 N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS § 7.03 & 7.04
(2015) (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2015).
47
See Alan Cole, The Highway Bill "Pension Gimmick:" A Primer, The Tax
Policy Blog (Jul 15, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/highway-bill-pensiongimmick-primer; See generally, Lewis, supra note 30, at 1-12 (in the 1980s and early
1990s, “retirement income policy took a back seat to revenue-driven exigencies of
budget deficit politics,” and it was not until the economic boom of the mid-1990s
that Congress would refocus on retirement income policy.)
44
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common, the plan document provided that plan assets would first be
allocated to the benefits of retirees. Retirees’ benefits were fully funded, but
4,000 vested employees between ages 40 and 60 got only 15% of what they
were promised. Two thousand nine hundred under age forty got nothing.48
That squarely presented the problem of default risk.49
Federal insurance became the solution.
Originally deemed
“reinsurance,” pension insurance was the brainchild of the United Auto
Workers.50 PBGC was largely modeled on the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. 51 Thus, for example, pension insurance is mandatory for
covered plans.52 And there are limits that serve as a form of co-insurance.53
PBGC guarantees benefits under single-employer plans and (since
1980 amendments) multiemployer plans.54 The insurable event for a singleWooten, supra note 42, at 731.
Id.
50
Wooten, supra note 42, at 716-17. On reinsurance generally, see Marcus A.
Mendoza, Reinsurance as Governance: Governmental Risk Management Pools as a
Case Study in the Governance Role Played by Reinsurance Institutions, 21 CONN.
INS. L. J. 53 (2014).
51
120 CONG. REC. S29950 (daily ed. Aug, 22, 1974) (statement of Sen.
Bentsen).
52
29 U.S.C. § 1306(a), (c) (2016).
53
Richard A. Ippolito, The Economics of Pension Insurance 21-24, 37-38
(1989) (One might loosely analogize PBGC to financial guarantee, or monoline,
insurance. Monoline insurers typically backstop municipal bonds or mortgage
obligations). See J.M. Pimbley, Bond Insurers, 22 J. OF APPLIED FIN. 35
(Spring/Summer
2012),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2689888; Sebastian Schich,
Challenges Related to Financial Guarantee Insurance, 2008 FIN. MARKET TRENDS
81 (Jun. 2008) (State laws confine them to that line of business, hence the term
“monoline.” Like a monoline insurer, PBGC insures against a third party’s default.
And because the third-party obligations are homogeneous, the risk is not diversified.
Telephone conversation with Christopher Anderson, Principal, Anderson Insights,
Inc. (May 9, 2016).
54
For single-employer plans, the maximum guaranteed amount is about
$60,000 per year at age 65. For multiemployer plans, the guarantee is much lower.
The maximum is a function of the participant’s service and the benefit accrual rate
under the plan, e.g., about $13,000 per year with 30 years of service, $8,600 per year
with 20 years of service, and so on. The guaranty of benefit increases is phased in
over five years for single-employer plans, but benefit increases under multiemployer
plans are not guaranteed at all if they are less than five-years old. Premiums for
single-employer plans are $64 per participant per year, plus $30 per $1,000 of
unfunded vested benefits, with scheduled increases to $80 and $41, respectively, by
2019. For multiemployer plans, premiums are $27 per participant per year. The
48
49
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employer plan is plan termination. 55 A plan sponsor can terminate an
underfunded single-employer plan only if it demonstrates financial
distress—liquidation in bankruptcy or inability to reorganize in bankruptcy
or to continue in business unless it sheds its pension plan. PBGC can initiate
termination if a plan fails ERISA’s minimum funding standard, if it will be
unable to pay benefits when due, or if PBGC’s long-run loss may increase
unreasonably if the plan is not terminated (for instance, if the sale of a
profitable subsidiary would lessen the employer’s ability to fund the plan).56
On termination of an underfunded plan, PBGC becomes trustee,
taking over the plan’s assets and its obligations. When a plan terminates, the
employer is liable to PBGC for the difference between the plan’s benefit
liabilities and its assets.57 Employer liability is meant to keep plan sponsors
from promising benefits they cannot afford, thereby shifting the financial
burden to the insurance program and to other sponsors whose premiums
support the program. 58 A PBGC regulation provides that liabilities are
valued using surveys of closeout annuity prices. The regulation uses a
constant mortality factor, so the higher the surveyed price the lower the
interest factor.59 The employer is also liable to the agency for any unpaid
contributions, and for an exit fee known as a termination premium.60 PBGC
has taken in more than 4,000 single-employer plans, and its single-employer
insurance fund has a $24 billion deficit.61

premium rates are indexed for inflation. 29 U.S.C §§ 1306, 1322, 1322A. PBGC is
financed by premiums, assets of terminated plans, recovery on claims, and
investment
earnings.
2015
PBGC
ANN.
REP.
10,
http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2015-annual-report.pdf.
55
29 U.S.C. § 1361 (2016).
56
29 U.S.C. §§ 1341(c), 1342(a) (2016). ERISA makes all 80% commonly
owned corporations or unincorporated businesses (a “controlled group”) jointly and
severally liable for pension contributions. 26 U.S.C. §§ 412(b)(2), 414(b), (c), 26
C.F.R. §§ 1.414(b)(1), 1.414(c)-1-(c)-5 (2016). The controlled group is also liable
to PBGC for the obligations described in nn. 59, 62, and to multiemployer plans for
those described in nn. 67-68, post. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(14), 1301(b)(1), 1362(a),
29 C.F.R. § 4001.2 (2016).
57
29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(18), 1362(c) (2016).
58
S. REP. NO 93-383, at 87 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4971.
59
29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.41-.75 (2016); 70 Fed. Reg. 72,205 (Dec. 2, 2005)
(codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 4044).
60
29 U.S.C. §§ 1306(a)(7), 1362(b) (2016).
61
2015 PBGC ANN REP., supra note 54, at 23. PBGC is not backed by the full
faith and credit of the United States. See id. at 10.
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Multiemployer plans can terminate, by mass withdrawal or by plan
amendment.62 The insurable event, however, is insolvency, the inability to
pay benefits in a given year. 63 PBGC doesn’t become trustee of
multiemployer plans, but provides them with financial assistance to pay
benefits at the guaranteed level.64
Multiemployer plans spread the risk of business failure. When an
employer withdraws, by going non-union or ceasing business, it incurs
withdrawal liability for its share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits.65 It
pays that liability in installments designed to approximate its contributions
at their highest point.66 Withdrawal liability is meant to slow the “vicious
downward spiral” when employers start to abandon a troubled plan. It does
that by neutralizing incentives to withdraw, shoring up plans affected by
withdrawals, and keeping faith with remaining employers.67 Nevertheless,
PBGC provides financial assistance to more than 50 insolvent plans, and its
multiemployer insurance fund has a $52 billion deficit.68
D.

EXEMPTION OF PUBLIC PLANS FROM ERISA

Congress exempted state and local plans from ERISA’s vesting,
funding, and insurance regimes. Congress had several reasons including:



public plans’ vesting provisions were then more generous than
those of private plans;
“the ability of the governmental entities to fulfill their
obligations to employees through their taxing powers was an
adequate substitute for both minimum funding standards and
plan termination insurance”69; and

29 U.S.C. § 1341A (2016).
29 U.S.C. § 1426 (2016).
64
29 U.S.C. § 1322A, 1431 (2016).
65
29 U.S.C. § 1381 (2016).
66
29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1) (2016).
67
On the characteristics of multiemployer plans and withdrawal liability, See
Jayne E. Zanglein et al., Erisa Litigation 1393-95, 1407-13 (5th ed. 2014 and 2015
Supp.).
68
2015 PBGC ANN REP., supra note 54, at 3, 23.
69
Rose v. Long Island R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1987)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
62
63
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“imposition of the minimum funding and other standards would
entail unacceptable cost implications to governmental
entities.”70

Congress also did not want to intrude on areas of state concerns. For
example, the House Committee on Education and Labor report stated:
There are literally thousands of public employee retirement
systems operated by towns, counties, authorities and cities
in addition to the state and Federal plans. Eligibility,
vesting, and funding provisions are at least as diverse as
those in the private sector with the added uniqueness added
by the legislative process. For this reason the Committee is
convinced that additional data and study is necessary before
any attempt is made to address the issues of vesting and
funding with respect to public plans.71
On the other hand, some were concerned that public pensions were
so generous that it was unlikely that adequate taxes would be allocated to
them. Congressman John Erlenborn of Illinois, for example, noted that
lawsuits in Philadelphia, Detroit, and Illinois were seeking to compel funding
in amounts that ranged from $18 million to $1.7 billion.72
Congress commissioned a study to determine "the necessity for
Federal legislation and standards with respect to such plans."73 In 1978, the
House Committee on Education and Labor issued a Pension Task Force
Report on Public Employee Retirement Systems. The Report found that plan
members, government officials, and the general public were kept in the dark
about the true costs of public pensions, and that there was compelling need
Id.
Id.; See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (Three years earlier,
the Supreme Court had emphasized “Our Federalism,” a “system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments.”);
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (The Court held that
the Tenth Amendment prevents the national government from imposing minimum
wages on local government employees based on the reach of the Commerce Clause);
See generally Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549
(2012) (Federalism enjoyed another revival in the last decade).
72
H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 43 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 466768.
73
29 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2016).
70
71

160

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 23

for uniform actuarial measures to assess their funding requirements. The
Report also found serious deficiencies in reporting and disclosure, and a need
for fiduciary standards.74
Bills were regularly introduced after ERISA was passed to establish
minimum reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary standards for public plans.
Initially dubbed “PERISA,” later versions were called “PEPPRA”—the
Public Employee Pension Plan Reporting and Accountability Act—to reflect
their more limited scope.75 No such bill was ever enacted.
III.

FEDERAL MINIMUM FUNDING STANDARDS

ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code set minimum funding
standards for defined benefit plans. The initial standards were a significant
improvement on pre-ERISA law. The standards were strengthened over two
decades, including limits on actuarial discretion, shorter amortization
periods, better enforcement tools, and stricter rules for poorly funded plans.
More recently, some of the standards were relaxed.
A.

SINGLE-EMPLOYER PLANS

A plan sponsor must make an annual contribution. To determine the
annual contribution, the plan actuary will first calculate the “funding target,”
or the present value of plan benefits at the beginning of the year. From the
funding target, she will subtract the value of plan assets, to derive the
“shortfall.” Next, she will set up a schedule to amortize the shortfall over
seven years, netting out unamortized charges from prior years, to derive the
“shortfall amortization charge.” The actuary will also calculate “normal
cost,” or the present value of benefits expected to be earned in the year plus
an estimate of expenses in the year. 76 Finally, the actuary will add the
shortfall amortization charge and normal cost. The sum is the year’s required
contribution.

COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB. 95th Cong., Pension Task Force Report on Public
Employee Retirement Systems (Comm. Print 1987).
75
Pub. Employee Pension Benefit Plans: J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the Comm. on Ways & Means & Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations
of the Comm. on Educ.& Labor, 98th Cong., (Nov. 15, 1983) at 2.
76
26 U.S.C. § 430(a)-(c). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1133-1135; Lynn A. Cook & James
E. Holland, Jr., 371-6TH U.S. INCOME: EMPLOYEE PLANS—DEDUCTIONS,
CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUNDING, TAX MGMT. PORT. at A-113-75 (2015).
74
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As noted, the lower the interest assumption, the higher the present
value, and thus the greater the potential shortfall.77 The interest assumption
is based on an average of yields on high-quality corporate bonds, using a
yield curve (or segments of the curve) to fit maturity to expected benefit
payments. Mortality is to be prescribed by the Treasury Department at least
once every ten years.78 Mortality is currently based on the RP-2000 table
(with improvements).79
Contributions are generally due in quarterly installments, 15 days
after the close of the quarter. Any deficiency must be paid off in a “catchup payment” no later than 8-1/2 months after the close of the year. For
instance, contributions for the 2016 year are due April 15, July 15, and
October 15, 2016, and January 15, 2017, with the catch-up payment due
September 15, 2017.80
A sponsor may elect to create a prefunding balance if it contributes
more than the minimum required. It may then apply the prefunding balance
in lieu of cash contributions.81
A sponsor experiencing temporary substantial business hardship
may apply to IRS for a waiver of the year’s contribution. The waived amount
then becomes an additional amortization charge in the next five years. IRS
may require that security be given to the plan, enforceable by PBGC.82
Poorly funded plans are subject to greater discipline. A liquidity
shortfall contribution is required to the extent a plan’s liquid assets do not
equal three times its annual disbursements.83 Additional funding is required
if a plan is “at risk,” less than 80% funded. At-risk plans cannot increase
benefits; they must assume that employees will retire as early as possible and
take benefits in the most expensive form; and their funding is subject to a
4% “load” or surcharge. A pre-funding balance cannot be used instead of
cash contributions if the plan is at risk.84
Payment of shutdown benefits or other unpredictable contingent
event benefits is prohibited to the extent a plan is less than 60% funded, as
is payment of lump sums or purchase of annuities to the extent a plan is less
than 60% funded (100% funded if the sponsor is in bankruptcy). Benefit
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

McGill, supra note 4, at 207-09.
26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2), (3) (2016).
Cook & Holland, supra note 75, at A-122.
26 U.S.C. § 430(j) (2016).
26 U.S.C. § 430(f)(3) (2016).
26 U.S.C §§ 412(c), 430(a)(1)(c), (e) (2016).
26 U.S.C. § 430(j)(4) (2016).
26 U.S.C § 430(i) (2016).
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accruals must cease to the extent the plan remains less than 60% funded.
Partial restrictions apply if the plan is between 60% and 80% funded.85
If the annual contribution is not made by the catch-up date, an
“accumulated funding deficiency” results, and an excise tax of 10% of the
deficiency is imposed. The tax increases to 100% if the deficiency is not
timely corrected.86
A plan fiduciary, a participant or beneficiary, or the Secretary of
Labor can bring suit to enforce the minimum funding standards.87 Case law
and Labor Department guidance require a fiduciary to pursue full collection
unless it would result in hardship and reduced collection.88
PBGC also enforces the minimum funding requirements. If the
unpaid balance exceeds one million dollars, a lien arises in favor of the plan
on all property of the controlled group. PBGC has sole authority to perfect
and enforce this lien.89

26 U.S.C. § 436 (2016).
26 U.S.C. § 4971 (2012).
87
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), (5) (2012).
88
In McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986), the employer
obtained a funding waiver based on the required showing of temporary substantial
business hardship, and later filed bankruptcy and terminated the pension plan.
Former employees sued plan fiduciaries for failing to seek contributions. In
affirming a grant of summary judgment for the fiduciaries, the court said, “whenever
an employer seeks to avoid making its pension plan payments, whether pursuant to
[a funding waiver] or in any other manner, trustees have a duty to investigate the
relevant facts, to explore alternative courses of action and, if in the best interests of
the plan participants, to bring suit against the employer.” But “[i]t normally will be
reasonable,” the court continued, “for plan fiduciaries to refrain from action which
might send the employer into bankruptcy or lead to the termination of the plan.” Id.
at 112. A fiduciary’s compromising a claim for delinquent contributions or giving
extended payment terms would ordinarily be a prohibited transaction under 29
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (2012). The Labor Department’s Prohibited Transaction
Exemption 76-1 permits trustees of a multiemployer plan to do so only if they make
“systematic, reasonable, and diligent efforts” to collect delinquent contributions and
only if they can demonstrate that the arrangement in a given case is reasonable and
likely to maximize the net collection. Employee Benefit Plan, 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740
(March 26, 1976).
89
26 U.S.C. § 430(k) (2012). The lien has the status of a federal tax lien. Thus,
for example, it may become senior to advances under a revolving credit arrangement
after 45 days or notice to the lender, whichever occurs first. 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (2012),
incorporated by reference in 26 U.S.C. § 430(k)(4)(C) (2012) and 29 U.S.C. §
1368(c)(1) (2012).
85
86
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MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS

Contributions are set by collective bargaining agreements, usually at
an hourly rate. The hourly rate is calibrated so that, when multiplied by an
estimate of hours to be worked, contributions will meet the statutory
minimum.
The minimum is set by a “funding standard account,” to which
specified charges and credits are made each year. If the total charges to the
funding standard account are greater than the total credits (including
contributions), there is a funding deficiency. In computing the charges and
credits, the plan’s actuary must use assumptions that are individually
reasonable and that in combination represent her best estimate of future
experience.90
A funding waiver can be granted if 10% of the employers would
otherwise suffer substantial business hardship, with the waived amount
amortized over 15 years. A plan can also seek an extension of the
amortization period from 15 to 20 years if it has adopted a funding
improvement plan (see below), or to 25 years if necessary to avoid plan
termination or a substantial benefit curtailment.91
The trustees of a multiemployer plan can bring suit to collect unpaid
contributions. ERISA provides for a simple collection suit with virtually no
defenses, and adds interest, liquidated damages, and attorney fees to the
judgment.92
Multiemployer plans in endangered or critical status (less than 80%
or 65% funded, respectively) must also adopt funding improvement plans
(FIP) or rehabilitation plans (RP). An endangered or “yellow zone” plan’s
FIP must project a one-third funding improvement over ten years. The FIP
typically contains a negotiated schedule of contribution increases and a

26 U.S.C. § 431(a), (c)(3) (2012).
26 U.S.C. §§ 412(c), 431(d) (2012).
92
29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g)(2), 1145 (2012). A third-party beneficiary is ordinarily
subject to the same defenses as the obligee, but, as a matter of federal labor law,
union misconduct is no defense to a multiemployer plan’s collection suit. Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960). By declaring that “[e]very employer who
is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the
plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not
inconsistent with law, make such contributions,” 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (2012), Congress
invalidated other defenses that make the contract merely voidable and not void. An
example is fraud in the inducement, as distinct from fraud in factum. Sw. Adm’rs,
Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986).
90
91
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default schedule if no agreement is reached. The default schedule typically
requires decreases in benefit accruals as well.93
A critical or “red zone” plan’s RP must project emergence from the
red zone in ten years. Red zone plans generally may suspend early retirement
subsidies and other ancillary benefits not in pay status and restrict lump
sums, in addition to reducing future accruals. If emergence is not possible,
a red zone plan must at least take reasonable measures to forestall
insolvency.94
Under the Multiemployer Plan Reform Act of 2014,95 there is a new
category, “critical and declining.” A plan that is projected to be insolvent
within 20 years (fifteen years if its ratio of inactive to active participants is
less than two to one) may permanently reduce benefits, even those in pay
status, except for people who are older than 80 or are disabled. The
reductions must be approved by the Treasury Department, in consultation
with the Labor Department and PBGC, and the plan may not reduce benefits
below 110% of the PBGC guaranteed level.96 MPRA also authorizes PBGC
to partition such a plan to reduce its own expected loss and maintain plan
solvency. In that event, the partitioned plan pays guaranteed benefits from
PBGC financial assistance.97

26 U.S.C. § 432(c) (2012).
26 U.S.C. § 432(e) (2012).
95
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, 128 Stat. 2130, 2773-822 (2014).
96
26 U.S.C. § 432(b) & (e) (2014). In the first major test of these rules, Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan, the Treasury Department
denied a benefit reduction application, finding that earnings and entry-age
assumptions were not reasonable, and that the proposed reductions were not
reasonably estimated to prevent insolvency. Letter from Kenneth R. Feinberg,
Special Master, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Gary Ford, Esq., Principal, Groom Law
Group, Thomas C. Nyhan, Exe. Director & the Bd. of Trs., Cent. States, Se. & Sw.
Areas
Pension
Plan
(May
6,
2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/services/Responses2/Central%20States%20Notification
%20Letter.pdf.
97
29 U.S.C. § 1413 (2012). In Road Carriers Local 707 Pension Plan, PBGC
denied a partition application, finding that employment and contribution projections
were unduly optimistic, and that there was insufficient evidence to reasonably expect
that the Plan would remain solvent following partition. Letter from PBGC to Kevin
McCaffrey, Interim Fund Manager & Bd. of Trs., Road Carriers Local 707 Welfare
& Pension Funds (June 2016), http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/PBGC-Letter-June2016.pdf.
93
94
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HISTORY OF ERISA’S FUNDING RULES
1. ERISA’s Reforms

Before ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code required that an employer
contribute only normal cost plus interest on unfunded accrued liability. 98
Thus, the unfunded liability might never be amortized. It was a recognized
“best practice” to amortize past service liability over 30 years, but even that
did not prevent the Studebaker disaster.99
The ERISA rules were a considerable improvement. ERISA
required plans to maintain a funding standard account, to which charges and
credits were added each year. Among those charges were amortization of
past service liability (generally over 30 years), losses from change in
actuarial assumptions (20 years), and experience losses (15 years). For
multiemployer plans, losses from both changes in assumptions and
experience were amortized over 15 years. Credits included gains from
changes in assumptions or experience, and they were similarly amortized.100
If the sum of charges and credits was a net charge, or “accumulated
funding deficiency,” there was a contribution due that year. Conversely, if
there was a “credit balance,” it could be used in future years in lieu of cash
contributions.101
Contributions were subject to the full funding limit, generally the
difference between the present value of accrued benefits projected for salary
increases and the lesser of market or actuarial value of assets. They were
also subject to the deductible limit, which involved a more complex
calculation, but was capped at the full funding limit.102
There were six approved funding methods.103 A funding method
identifies gains and losses each year and amortizes them (as in the unit credit
method), or spreads gains and losses by rolling them into normal cost (as in
the frozen initial liability method). The methods differ in how much they
backload funding costs.104
98
Steven Sass, ERISA’S Treatment of Default and Forfeiture Risk in Defined
Benefit Pension Plans: Reflections From ERISA at 40: What Were They Thinking?,
6 DREXEL L. REV. 495, 496 (2014).
99
Id. at 496-97.
100
26 U.S.C. § 412(b) (1976).
101
26 U.S.C. § 412(a) (2012).
102
26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(1), 412(c)(6) (2014).
103
26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012).
104
McGill, supra note 4, at 647-51; SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, WHICH PENSION
FUNDING METHOD IS RIGHT FOR YOU? 21-23 (No. 1, Session 54PD (Vol. 23 1997)),
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Assumptions and methods had to be reasonable in the aggregate and
represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience.105 This gave
the actuary considerable discretion. For example, conservative assumptions
could be offset by anti-conservative ones, and asset values could be
“smoothed” (gains and losses averaged) over five years, to dampen
volatility.106 The legislative history made clear that these choices were for
the actuary, and that the actuary was to exercise independent judgment.107
https://www.soa.org/Library/Proceedings/Record-Of-The-Society-OfActuaries/1990-99/1997/January/rsa97v23n154pd.aspx.
105
26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2012).
106
26 C.F.R. § 1.412(c)(2)-1(b) (2016). In some cases, the IRS challenged
assumptions on grounds that they were overly conservative and led to improperly
large deductions for contributions. The courts generally deferred to the actuaries’
judgments, emphasizing that assumptions needed only to be reasonable in the
aggregate, not individually. Rhoades, McKee & Boer v. United States, 43 F.3d 1071
(6th Cir. 1995); Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz v. Comm'r, 26 F.3d 291 (2d Cir.
1994); Vinson & Elkins v. Comm'r, 7 F.3d 1235 (5th Cir. 1993).
107
ERISA “requires that, for purposes of the minimum funding standard, all
plan costs, liabilities, rates of interest, and other factors under the plan are to be
determined on the basis of actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the
aggregate, are reasonable. Actuarial assumptions are to take into account the
experience of the plan and reasonable expectations. These assumptions are expected
to take into consideration past experience as well as other relevant factors. In
addition . . . the actuarial assumptions in combination are to offer the actuary's best
estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 28485 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5065. Moreover, actuarial
assumptions must be "independently determined by an actuary." It would be
"inappropriate for an employer to substitute his judgment for that of a qualified
actuary,” and “if such a circumstance were to arise an actuary would have to refuse
giving his favorable opinion . . . ." S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 70 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4955. Congress initially rejected any attempt to
standardize assumptions. The House Ways and Means Committee stated, “[T]he
proper actuarial assumptions may differ substantially between industries, among
firms, geographically, and over time. Further…each actuarial assumption may be
reasonable over a significant range and it would appear that the proper test would be
whether all actuarial assumptions used together are reasonable. These considerations
strongly indicate that any attempt to specify actuarial assumptions and funding
methods for pension plans would in effect place these plans in a straitjacket…, and
would be likely to result in cost estimates that are not reasonable.” H.R. Rep. No.
93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4694. Though suits against
pension actuaries are subject to defenses, actuarial malpractice is actionable. See,
e.g., Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., 329 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding actuarial
malpractice claim under state law is not preempted by ERISA).
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2. Amendments to the Minimum Funding Standards and
the Need for Further Reform
For single-employer plans, the funding rules have been amended
many times. For the first few decades after ERISA’s enactment, the rules
were mainly strengthened. For example, Congress adopted a deficit
reduction contribution in 1987. A sponsor whose plan was less than 90%
funded using prescribed assumptions (GAM-83 mortality and up to 105% of
the four-year average of 30-year Treasury yields) had to contribute an
additional amount to eliminate the deficit within three to seven years.108 In
the mid-2000s, however, Congress exempted plans in the airline and steel
industries from the deficit reduction contribution for a number of years, and
allowed them to use a higher interest rate to compute their contributions.109
The 1987 amendments also introduced the quarterly contributions
and the lien, and joint and several liability among controlled group
members. 110 The 1994 amendments prohibited benefit increases during
bankruptcy by poorly funded plans.111
Nevertheless, critics pointed out continuing weaknesses in ERISA’s
funding standards, either standing alone or when combined with regulatory
gaps in other areas. For example, PBGC Executive Director Steven
Kandarian testified before Congress in 2003 that:





funding targets are the result of legislative compromise rather than
an objective measure of full funding, don’t recognize that business
reverses often result in subsidized early retirements, and don’t
recognize the cost of annuitization;
credit balances permit funding holidays, despite possible investment
losses in the interim;
funding rules do not take employer credit risk into account;

108
Pension Protection Act of 1987, Title IX, Subtitle D of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203 § 9303, 101 Stat. 1330-333-343
(1987), (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 412(l) (1988)).
109
Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, §102, 118 Stat.
596, 599-602 (Apr. 10, 2004), codified as 26 U.S.C. § 412 (l)(12) (2006).
110
101 Stat. 1330-344-347, 1330-348-50, 1330-352-53 (codified as 26 U.S.C
§§ 412(b)(2), 430(c)(11), (j), (k)).
111
Retirement Protection Act of 1994, Title VII, Subtitle F of the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Pub. L. No. 103465, § 766, 108 Stat. 4809, 5036-37 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(33) (2006)).

168

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL




Vol. 23

the full funding limit and maximum deductible limit do not allow
plans to build up an adequate surplus for bad times;
funding rules do not take account of lump sum elections;
funding is too volatile, in part because smoothing rules don’t work
as well as they should.112

Kandarian cited the example of Bethlehem Steel, whose plan
terminated with a $3.9 billion shortfall. Due to credit balances, Bethlehem
made no contributions for the three years leading up to plan termination.
Kandarian also noted that pension liabilities are correlated with bond
yields but not equity returns. Equity investments therefore result in greater
volatility, and tend to shift risk from employers and employees to the
insurance system.113
David Walker, the U.S. Comptroller General, and Barbara Bovbjerg,
the Government Accountability Office’s Director of Education, Workforce
and Income Security Issues, echoed some of these observations. They also
noted that Bethlehem’s plan was heavily invested in equities, leading to
significant losses in the run-up to plan termination in 2003, and that
Polaroid’s plan was severely underfunded at termination partly because
contributions had been capped by the deductible limit.114
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, H.R. (2003)
(Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation),
http://archives.republicans.edlabor.house.gov/archive/
hearings/108th/fc/pbgc090403/kandarian.htm.
113
Under ERISA’s fiduciary standards, no investment is per se prudent or
imprudent. Under a Labor Department “safe harbor,” an investment is prudent if a
fiduciary has “given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances that,
given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should
know are relevant to the particular investment,” and has “acted accordingly.”
“Appropriate consideration” includes whether the investment is “reasonably
designed . . . to further the purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the risk of
loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return),” “the composition of the portfolio
with regard to diversification,” “liquidity and current return . . . relative to . . .
anticipated cash-flow requirements . . .,” and “projected return . . . relative to the
funding objectives of the plan.” 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2015).
114
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-873T, PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTY CORPORATION: SINGLE-EMPLOYER PENSION INSURANCE PROGRAM
FACES SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM RISKS: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON
EDUC.
&
THE
WORKFORCE,
H.R.
(2003),
http://www.gao.gov/
assets/120/110278.pdf.; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-176T,
PRIVATE PENSIONS: CHANGING FUNDING RULES AND ENHANCING INCENTIVES CAN
112
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David Wilcox, Deputy Director of the Federal Reserve, noted that
weak restrictions on lump sums and early retirement benefits could lead to
significant deterioration of plan funding. He added that the funding
standards did not permit, let alone require, pre-funding of shutdown benefits
or other unpredictable contingent event benefits.115
3. PPA and Beyond
The 2006 Pension Protection Act made a major overhaul, removing
virtually all remaining actuarial discretion in the case of single-employer
plans, and imposing strict rules to shore up the defined benefit system.116 For
single-employer plans, there is no longer a set of charges and credits, to be
amortized over various periods. Rather, each year, the shortfall is reckoned,
the unamortized portions of prior year shortfalls are netted, and the yearly
contribution is computed based on seven-year amortization, plus normal
cost.
The assumptions were constrained, as noted, to the corporate-bond
yield curve and mortality factors prescribed by the Treasury Department.
Asset values could be smoothed over no more than two years, and the result
had to be within a 90-100% corridor of fair market value. A single actuarial
method (the unit benefit method) was required. The special funding rules
and benefit restrictions were adopted for “at-risk” plans. 117 And the
deductible limit was increased to normal cost plus 150% of the funding
target, less assets.118

IMPROVE PLAN FUNDING: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMM. ON EDUC. & THE
WORKFORCE, H.R. (2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110468.pdf.
115
David W. Wilcox, Reforming the Defined-Benefit Pension System,
BROOKINGS, 235 (2016), http://www.brookings.edu/~/ media/projects/bpea/spring2006/2006a_bpea_wilcox.pdf.
116
The pre-PPA rules are summarized in Cook & Holland, supra note 75, at A141-75, and in STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION
PLANS AND THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.jct.gov/x-3-05.pdf. The PPA changes are summarized in PATRICK
PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33703: SUMMARY OF THE PENSION
PROTECTION
ACT
OF
2006
(2006),
https://www.worldatwork.org/
waw/adimLink?id=15322.
117
Pension Protection Act of 2006 §§ 112, 113, 120 Stat. at 839-42, 847-51.
118
Cook & Holland, supra note 75, at A-113-40.
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While multiemployer plan actuaries retained discretion on funding
methods and assumptions, the amortization period for post-PPA experience
was shortened to fifteen years.119
But the new rules largely took effect just as the Great Recession
began. So Congress adopted relief provisions.120 For single-employer plans,
they included allowing the smoothing of asset values for the bleak years 2008
and 2009, the averaging of interest rates over a 25-year look-back period,
and, in lieu of the standard seven-year amortization schedule, an election of
interest-only payments for two years followed by seven-year amortization
(“2 and 7”) or fifteen-year amortization. For multiemployer plans, they
included allowing 30-year amortization of investment losses that occurred in
2008 or 2009, and ten-year averaging of those losses for asset-valuation
purposes.121
These provisions gave sponsors more flexibility, but traded off
PPA’s goal of shoring up the system as a whole. By 2013, the ERISA
agencies were reporting that, despite improvements, many multiemployer
plans could still fail. In 2014, the Congressional Research Service reported
that the PBGC multiemployer insurance system itself was at risk of failing
within a decade or so. 122 MPRA followed, as part of the “Cromnibus”
spending bill at the end of 2014.
Funding legislation is often enacted as part of a larger package. For
example, the 1987 amendments were part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, and the 1994 amendments were part of the General
119
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 201, 120 Stat 780,
858-68 (2006), codified as 26 U.S.C § 431(b).
120
PPA itself provided relief to airlines, allowing them to use pre-PPA funding
rules with generous interest assumptions and seventeen-year amortization. Pub. L.
No. 109-208, § 402(e)(2), 120 Stat. 780, (codified at 925-28, 26 U.S.C. § 430 note
(2012)).
121
Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension
Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-192, §§ 201-02, 211, 124 Stat. 1280, 1283-85,
1290-93, 1297-99, 1302-06 (2010); Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 40211, 126 Stat. 405, 846-50 (codified as 26 U.S.C. §
404 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2012)).
122
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTY CORP., MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS: REPORT TO CONGRESS
REQUIRED BY THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, 113TH CONG. (2013),
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/pbgc-report-multiemployer-pension-plans.pdf;
JOHN J. TOPOLESKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43305, MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED
BENEFIT (DB) PENSION PLANS: A PRIMER AND ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS
(2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43305.pdf
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. But, that leaves the pension changes open
to revenue-scoring objectives. For example, recent rounds of legislation that
provided funding relief—as well as PBGC premium increases--helped to
raise federal revenue estimates as part of federal budget legislation and to
keep the Highway Trust Fund afloat. 123 Two bills have recently been
introduced to prevent use of PBGC premium increases this way: one would
take PBGC off-budget, and the other would prohibit use of PBGC premium
increases as an offset to pay for other federal spending.124
IV.

REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AND OTHER CONTROLS

Disclosure to plan participants, investors, and, for pooled funds, to
employers and their stakeholders, can influence funding. 125 Both singleemployer and multiemployer plans must file an Annual Report (Form 5500)
with the ERISA agencies. A defined benefit plan’s Annual Report must
include:





statements of assets and liabilities and changes in net assets available
for benefits (including revenue and expenses);
schedules of investment assets and related-party transactions, among
others;
footnote disclosures on significant plan amendments and their
impact on benefits and on the plan’s funding policy and any changes
to it;
a certified public accountant’s opinion that the financial statements
are presented fairly in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles; and

Title V of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, §§ 50104, 129 Stat. 591-594 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i)(VI) - (VIII), (G),
(a)(8)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1307(a); 26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2)(C)(iv)(II)); Title II of the
Highway and Transportation Funding Act (“HATFA”) of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113159, § 2003, 128 Stat. 1839, 1849-51 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2)(B) & (C)(iv)
(2012)); see PBGC, TECH. UPDATE 14-1: EFFECT OF HATFA ON PBGC PREMIUMS
(2014), http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/other-guidance/tu/tu14-1.html.
124
Pension and Budget Integrity Act of 2016, H. R. 4955, 114th Cong. (2016)
(would take PBGC off-budget); Pension and Budget Integrity Act of 2016, S. 3240,
114th Cong. (2016) (would prohibit use of PBGC premium increases as an offset for
other federal spending).
125
Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 1, at 1347-49; Shnitser, supra note 1, at
688-91.
123
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an enrolled actuary’s statement of the required contributions,
including the normal cost, funding target, and asset values; currentyear and unreported prior-year-contributions; the methods and
assumptions and any changes to them; and a statement that the report
is complete and accurate and the assumptions are reasonable.126

Under PPA, a plan with a funding shortfall must provide participants
and beneficiaries with an annual funding notice (“AFN”). The AFN must
disclose:







the amount of the shortfall;
that the shortfall is based on a 25-year average of interest rates;
what it would be using a two-year average;
the funding target attainment percentage;
the minimum funding contributions for the past three years; and
the limits of PBGC’s guaranty.127

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 requires a
public company to record its net periodic pension expense on its financial
statements. Net periodic pension expense is a spreading of the total cost of
the plan over the plan’s lifetime, using a prescribed method. For more than
a decade, FAS 158 (and now Accounting Standard Codification 715) has
also required a company to record the shortfall or surplus on the balance
sheet, on both an Accumulated Benefit Obligation (current service and
salary) and a Projected Benefit Obligation (current service and projected
salary) basis.128
For that purpose, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(“FASB”) requires that the interest assumption reflect closeout costs, e.g.,
using rates on high-quality corporate bonds with maturities consistent with

29 U.S.C. §§1023(a), (b), (d).
29 U.S.C. § 1021(f) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-4(a).
128
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., CONCEPT STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 87 5 (1985); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
CONCEPT STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 132 6 (1998).
126
127
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expected payouts.129 Annual surveys by consulting firms reflect the range of
mainstream assumptions.130
As of 2011, FASB also requires a company participating in a
multiemployer plan to disclose information about the plan’s zone status,
among other things. The company need not disclose potential withdrawal
liability, except (under rules on accounting for contingencies) when
withdrawal is probable or reasonably possible.131
The annuity marketplace provides a useful benchmark. Insurers
regularly bid on pension plan closeout annuity contracts. PBGC’s regulatory
method for valuing benefit liabilities is based on this market. PBGC has
historically based its valuation assumptions on annuity prices, ascertained
from double-blind surveys of annuity issuers. Financial economists
generally support using risk-free rates to value pension liabilities, which
generally provides similar results.132
News Release: FASB Improves Employer Disclosures for Multiemployer
Pension Plans, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (Jul. 27, 2011)
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsP
age&cid=1176158794021 (noting the pooling effect of state “cost-sharing multipleemployer” plans, akin to private-sector multiemployer plans, can obscure an
individual employer’s obligations and shield them from the scrutiny of lenders and
other stakeholders); Shnitser, supra note 1, at 689-91.
130
E.g., KEN STOLER, KEVIN HASSAN & DEBBIE RUDIN, PENSION/OPEB 2014
ASSUMPTION AND DISCLOSURE SURVEY (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014).
131
Media Advisory 09/21/11: FASB Issues Accounting Standards Update to
Improve Employer Disclosures for Multiemployer Pension Plans, FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?
pagename=FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=1176158943432; see Shnitser,
supra note 1, at 705 (noting that the contribution of the ARC has been considered a
measure of funding discipline); KEITH BRAINARD & ALEX BROWN, SPOTLIGHT ON
THE ANNUAL REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION EXPERIENCE OF STATE RETIREMENT PLANS,
FY 01- TO FY 13 9 (NAT’L ASS’N. OF ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., 2015).
132
Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 1, 1324; In re US Airways Group, 303
B.R. 784, 795-96 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating “The real issue is one of risk. Annuity
issuers base their pricing on returns offered by low-risk investments (typically highquality corporate bonds). Those returns are lower than the returns that might be
achieved by investing in the stock market. The stock market, however, is highly
volatile and far from certain . . . [N]o one can predict with certainty what returns
the stock market will produce over the next 50 years. Given the strong societal
interest in protecting pension benefits, a risk-free or nearly risk-free rate to value the
pension liability is more appropriate than a rate based on optimistic projections (even
if those projections are widely-shared by fund managers) as to the stock market's
future long-term performance.”).
129
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Actuarial independence and licensure are important controls. 133
Under ERISA, an enrolled actuary (one licensed by a federal board, the Joint
Board for Enrollment of Actuaries, or “JBEA”) must certify the required
contribution. The JBEA can suspend or terminate an actuary’s enrollment
for misfeasance.134 More generally, actuaries are subject to a uniform Code
of Conduct, whose main Precept reads, “An Actuary shall act honestly, with
integrity and competence, and in a manner to fulfill the profession’s
responsibility to the public and to uphold the reputation of the actuarial
profession.” The Code also requires adherence to Actuarial Standards of
Practice (“ASOP”). 135 ASOP 4, Measuring Pension Obligations, and
Determining Pension Plan Costs or Contributions, is the principal standard
in this area.136
V.

WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE
EXPERIENCE UNDER ERISA?

Like PBGC-insured plans, public plans involve risks to workers and
retirees and uncertainties for sponsors and their stakeholders. Based on the
private-sector experience, reformers might propose that state lawmakers:
A. Adopt responsible funding rules, and avoid the cycle of
tightening and relaxing them. The history of ERISA’s funding rules
suggests that funding rules should be strong but should have enough
flexibility to obviate temporary relief measures. That observation
seems fully applicable to the public sector.

Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 1, at 1349-52, 1361 (noting not all state
laws require actuarially based contributions. Of those that do, not all require that
assumptions be reasonable).
134
29 U.S.C. §§ 1241, 1242 (2011).
135
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2 (2001).
136
ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD., ACTUARIAL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE NO. 4:
MEASURING PENSION OBLIGATIONS AND DETERMINING PENSION PLAN COSTS OR
CONTRIBUTIONS (Dec. 2013), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/asop004_173-3.pdf; see, e.g., Press Release, Society of
Actuaries, Society of Actuaries Response to Actuarial Standards Bd. Request for
Comments-ASOPS & Pub. Pension Plan Funding & Accounting (Oct. 30, 2014),
https://www.soa.org/News-and-Publications/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Society-ofActuaries-Response-to-Actuarial-Standards-Board-Request-for-Comments%E2%80%93-ASOPs-and-Public-Pension-Plan-Funding-and-Accounting.aspx.
133
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B. Require actuarial independence. ERISA’s emphasis on actuarial
independence removes discretion from the employer. Because
public plans are inherently political, this could be a useful
complement to other governance reforms suggested by the literature.
C. Require conservative actuarial assumptions. Under ERISA,
actuarial discretion has become more and more constrained at least
for single-employer plans. But even a facially sound assumption can
be weakened by a gimmick, like the 25-year lookback on corporate
bond yields. Given the dynamics of budget politics, it would be hard
to put gimmicks off-limits, but model legislation could help to define
best practices.
D. Provide self-executing enforcement tools. The ERISA funding
lien requires only perfection to have the status of a federal tax lien.
It may then become senior to a revolving credit arrangement, which
tends to bring the parties to the table. That remedy would almost
certainly not apply in the public sector, due to sovereign immunity
and concerns about holding municipal services hostage. But for
local plans, withholding of state revenue-sharing funds seems an
even more effective way of ensuring that pension contributions are
made.
E. Make funding status and its implications transparent to
stakeholders. ERISA’s reporting and disclosure regime is a robust
model, and its Annual Funding Notice highlights the relationship
between poor funding and potential loss of benefits. Accounting
standards have advanced in both the private and public sectors. They
may generate pressure for funding discipline by lenders and other
stakeholders. Disclosure of the ARC/ADC would promote that
objective.
F. Encourage pre-funding to provide a reserve against lean times.
The experience with the Tax Code’s full funding and deductible
limits illustrates the tension between revenue and social objectives,
and the effect on plans of weak employers. Income tax treatment is
not relevant for public plans, but, as shown by events in Illinois and
New Jersey, pension funding always competes with other budget
imperatives.
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G. Invest with an eye to funding level, risk, and demographics.
Public plan investing and risk management strategies are beyond the
scope of this article, though they also have a significant effect on
plan funding. ERISA has no per se investment constraints. The core
guidance emphasizes the need to consider risk, return, and cash-flow
objectives, which logically requires an understanding of the plan’s
funding level, risk tolerance, and plan population.
H. Guard against undue cross-subsidies. ERISA’s withdrawal
liability helped to hold multiemployer plans together for three
decades, ameliorating the shift of legacy costs from some employers
to others. Though some multiemployer plans now are severely
distressed, the situation surely would have been worse if there had
been no cost for withdrawal. Many state systems are multipleemployer arrangements. As illustrated by the Stockton case,
statutory and contractual withdrawal fees may help to keep
employers in the fold.
I. Guard against extraordinary payouts. The ERISA experience
with lump sums and contingent event benefits demonstrates the risk,
at least for plans that are poorly funded or whose employers are
declining. If these benefits are triggered by workforce reductions,
the plan may be less sustainable.
J. Set a balance between funding and benefit promises. The PPA
regime for troubled multiemployer plans includes reductions of
future accruals, and MPRA introduced reductions of accrued
benefits for the most troubled. Neither is possible under most state
constitutions, except for local plans in a bankruptcy context. Rather,
as the Illinois Supreme Court held, a constitutional protection of
pensions may imply a taxpayer guaranty. This suggests the
importance of setting a balance between benefit promises and
expected funding.

